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Nation, State, and Cross-Strait Relations:
Perspectives from Taiwan1
Horng-luen Wang

I. Introduction: An Overview of the
National Question in Taiwan

T

he problems surrounding the theoretical understanding of
“nation” and “state” in Taiwan are among the most intriguing and
most confusing in the contemporary world. Some might know that
there is a so-called “separatist” or “independence” movement, often
referred to as Taiwanese nationalism, that intends to turn Taiwan into
a nation; some others might also know that there have been tensions
between Taiwan and China that could lead to devastating military conflicts, as made manifest in the two missile crises in 1996 and 2000.
I use “national question” as a general term to refer to those issues
pertaining to Taiwan’s nation/nationalism, state, and cross-Strait relations. Although Taiwan’s national question has been attracting more
and more attention from both within and outside Taiwan during the
past decade, the growing awareness of this problem has unfortunately
been beset with misconceptions and misunderstandings. The aim of
this essay is to clarify these issues by providing an alternative perspective through which to analyze Taiwan’s national question. Such
an analysis, it is hoped, may help bring new perspectives to break the
current impasse.
I shall first point out and dispute the bias and insufficiencies of a
number of popular images or “common sense” notions about Taiwan’s
national question. Next, I shall advance an institutional approach with
a global perspective to view the problem. I argue that Taiwan’s national
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question is in essence an international problem embodied in institutional settings of the Republic of China (ROC) nation. The recent escalation of nationalist politics is the result of the growing institutional
crises of the ROC nation, exacerbated by ethnic tensions within Taiwan
and confounded by cross-Strait relations between Taiwan and China.
Consequently, the reduction of tensions and the avoidance of potential conflict between Taiwan and China can only come about through
the efforts of people and states on both sides of the Taiwan Strait (i.e.,
a bottom-up solution) as well as an involvement of the international
community.
II. Some Common Misunderstandings and Misconceptions
A. Regarding Taiwan’s National Question
Two popular views dominate the current understanding of Taiwan’s
national question within the general public, both within and outside
the island. The first is an ethnic explanation; the other is what can be
called “the divided nation model.” In spite of their popularity, both
views are neither sufficient for the purposes of explaining Taiwanese
nationalism, nor do they provide a comprehensive understanding of
Taiwan’s national question. As a matter of fact, the insufficiencies that
emanate from these misunderstandings are partly accountable for what
is at stake in the dispute surrounding Taiwan’s national question.

1. The Ethnic Explanation
Ethnic tensions and conflicts between two dichotomous groups (the
so-called “Mainlanders” and the “Taiwanese”) are the most popular
and convenient way of viewing Taiwan’s national question. It is often
held that the Mainlanders (those who fled from mainland China to
Taiwan with the exiled KMT regime in 1949, and their offspring) tend
to favor a Chinese identity and opt for future reunification with China.
On the other hand, the Taiwanese (mainly Holo- but sometimes including the Hakka-speaking people who had settled on the island for several generations before the wave of immigrants who arrived with the
KMT) tend towards a Taiwanese identity and thus favor Taiwan Independence (TI). Accordingly, the political camps can be divided roughly
into two: the “Blue” (favoring unification) vs. the “Green” (favoring
independence).
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The ethnic explanation is insufficient at best and misleading at
worst in that the so-called ethnic conflicts between Mainlanders and
Taiwanese are themselves part of the result rather than the cause of
Taiwan’s national question. Imagine the following scenario: had Taiwan not been ceded to and colonized by Japan in 1895, and had Taiwan
not been occupied by the exile KMT (Kuomintang, literally “national
party”) regime from mainland China in 1949, then it would have been
highly probable that there would not be any distinction at all between
Mainlanders and Taiwanese. Put another way, the dichotomy between
the two “ethnic groups” is itself the product of Taiwan’s national question, in which Taiwan’s belonging to the state (be it the Qing Dynasty
of imperial China, Japan, or the KMT) has been a shifting dispute.2
The ethnic explanation is impeded by the difficulty of characterizing Taiwanese nationalism, which runs against conventional wisdom
about nations and nationalism and thus cannot be easily categorized.
One of the most fatal and misleading characterizations of Taiwanese
nationalism is to view it as a “separatist movement” that is comparable
to, for example, Quebec vs. Canada or Catalonia vs. Spain. Quebec and
Catalonia are separatist movements in that those national struggles
seek separation from the states whose jurisdiction they are under. This,
however, is not applicable to Taiwan. Contemporary Taiwan does not
share the same political roof with China as Quebec does with Canada or
Catalonia does with Spain. Hence the case for “Taiwan Independence”
sounds rather confusing to many outsiders. The oft-asked question is:
“Independence from whom?” If Taiwanese nationalism is understood
as the struggle of the Taiwanese (the oppressed majority) against the
Mainlanders (the ruling minority) during the KMT era, then why did
nationalist politics in Taiwan escalate rather than decline after the year
2000, when ethnic Taiwanese became the ruling majority and the proIndependence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) replaced the KMT.
I am not suggesting that ethnic factors are irrelevant or unimportant
in explaining Taiwan’s national question. However, to view the problem of Taiwan’s national question as originating from conflicts between
these two ethnic groups is quite misleading. Ethnic problems and the
national question are correlated, but they are not the same, nor can
they be conflated with each other.
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2. The “Divided-Nation Model”
The other popular misconception concerning Taiwan’s national question is to view Taiwan as a part of the divided Chinese nation, the other
part being mainland China under the rule of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP), with the national title “People’s Republic of China.” This
view, held particularly in the early years, is still popular in scholarly
discussions and is widely held by a majority of the Taiwanese population even today (although, as will be shown below, the popularity
of such a view has receded considerably in recent years). Using the
“Divided Nation” model to explain Taiwan’s national question can be
said to be only half-true, but the other half of that equation may help
to illuminate the real nature of Taiwan’s national question that necessitates further analysis.
Just like former Vietnam, pre-1990 Germany, and contemporary
Korea, China and Taiwan viewed together were a divided nation, resulting from the Cold War structure after the Second World War. In this
sense, Taiwan’s national question, from its inception, was indeed an
international problem, as the prolonged division between China and
Taiwan was a Cold War strategy. However, if we try to understand Taiwan’s national question from this divided nation model, it will become
quite misleading—but by debunking such a misunderstanding, we
can get closer to what is at stake in Taiwan’s national question. Let me
elaborate this in two points.
Firstly, although the division between Taiwan and China resembles
other divided nations after WWII, such a fact is neither well known nor
officially recognized. People know that Vietnam was once divided into
North and South, and the division ended after a protracted war. It is
also widely known that there used to be two Germanys, which became
reunified in a dramatic fashion in 1990. As for Korea, it has thus far
remained divided into North and South, and such a fact has also been
widely acknowledged around the world. The case of China and Taiwan, however, is rather different. Most states in the world endorse
the so-called “One China policy,” which maintains that there is only
one China in the world and that Taiwan is part of China. China, after
all, is not considered a divided nation. Moreover, although Taiwan
was once characterized as “Free China” before the 1970s, few people
nowadays know that Taiwan bears the national title of “Republic of
China” (ROC). Far fewer know that Taiwan/ROC is not recognized as
a sovereign state. Quite the opposite, most people assume it is, because
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it has its own government and army, exercises full democracy, and citizens elect their own president through a direct voting system. Such a
discrepancy has planted tragic seeds for Taiwanese nationalism. I shall
get to this in a later section.
The second reason why the divided nation model does not fit Taiwan involves the democratic transformation of Taiwanese politics in
the past few decades. Since the KMT took refuge in Taiwan in 1949,
it has endeavored to maintain a Chinese identity and Chinese nationalism. Since 1988, when Lee Teng-hui succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo
to become the first “native-born” president, the situation began to
change. Lee Teng-hui swung between Chinese and Taiwanese identities from time to time. Indeed, the momentum of nation building
shifted from a Chinese nationalism (for unification) to a Taiwanese
nationalism (for independence) during Lee’s 12-year presidential term.
The shift reached its peak in 2000 when Chen Shui-bian won the presidential election and the pro-Independence DPP became the ruling
party. Since the DPP, established in 1987 and constituted in the main
by Taiwanese rather than Mainlanders, does not bear the memory of
the Chinese civil war as the KMT does, the legacy of the civil war is
denied. For pro-Independence nationalists, the divided nation model
certainly does not apply to Taiwan, since they never consider Taiwan and China a divided nation that should be reunified. Quite the
opposite! In their view, Taiwan and China are “two different nations”
instead of “a nation divided in two.”
III. An Alternative Perspective and the Analytical Framework
If the ethnic explanation and the divided nation model cannot satisfactorily explain Taiwan’s national question, and if Taiwanese nationalism
cannot be perceived as a “separatist movement” as it usually is, how
else can it be understood? I argue that the question must be viewed
globally, from an institutionalist approach, in which two factors are
emphasized: the one institutional, the other global or international.
The institutionalist approach to nations and nationalism is first theorized by sociologist Rogers Brubaker in his path-breaking Nationalism Reframed. Drawing on the insights from institutionalism and new
institutionalism in various disciplines, Brubaker proposed that nation
and nationhood can be better understood, not as substance but as institutionalized form, not as collectivity but as practical category, and not
as entity but as contingent event.3 In his original formulation, Brubaker
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distinguishes between two aspects of institutionalization of nationhood and nationality: one concerning the territorial organization of
political administration, the other concerning the classification of persons.4 To take it a step further, I propose that such a distinction of institutions corresponds roughly to two “ideal types” of the nation-state:
the civic-territorial model and the ethno-cultural model.5 While such
a distinction might seem banal today, it nonetheless has important
implications for our understanding of the institutions of the nation.
The civic-territorial model essentially concerns the political organization of the nation regarding sovereignty, territoriality, and citizenship.
The ethno-cultural model involves (re)presentation of the nation in
the symbolic realm, including national culture, national history, the
classification scheme of people, and the like. To be sure, no nation has
in reality been founded solely on either of the two models. For those
nations built on the ethno-cultural model, there are still institutions
that define these nations in civic-territorial terms. Conversely, nations
based on the civic-territorial model contain ethno-cultural elements in
defining their nationhood. The weaving of these two types of institutions actualizes the existence of a specific nation. These two types of
institutions, in turn, furnish the grids of the classification schemes on
the political/territorial and the cultural/cognitive maps, respectively,
on the worldwide level. They are highly correlated to each other, but
neither can be reduced to the logic of the other.
Moreover, according to the property of relativity that we learn from
the theory of new institutionalism, whether a social pattern or practice
can be seen as an institution depends on the context of our analysis.6
In the context of nationhood and nationality, the property of relativity brings us to what is known as the “institutionalist theory of world
polity,” developed by John Meyer and his colleagues.7 Institutions of
nationhood and nationality have to perform in two relative contexts:
the domestic/national level and the global/international level.
Combining the above discussions, we can obtain a two-by-two table
according to “types of institutions” and “levels of analysis” respectively. (See Table 1.)
With this analytical framework, I argue that the existence of a nation
is hinged upon an ensemble of intersecting institutions that can be
classified into civic-territorial and ethno-cultural types. Both types of
institutions, moreover, have to be articulated on both the domestic
and international levels. If either type fails to articulate at either level,
the existence of the nation will be jeopardized and will most probably

50

Horng-luen Wang

Table 1: Civic-Territorial and Ethno-Cultural Institutions of Nationhood on
International and National Levels
Civic-territorial institutions
(Political/territorial map)

Ethno-cultural institutions
(Cultural/cognitive map)

International/
Global level

• International organizations
• International law
• Transnational arbitration
system
• Diplomacy

• International cultural grammar
of nationhood* (Löfgren 1989)
• International epistemic
communities* (Haas 1992)

National/
Domestic
level

• State sovereignty, territoriality,
and citizenship
• Signifying institutions (national
title, flag, anthem, etc.)

• “National culture”
• Language
• Cultural patrimonies
• “Nation-view” and knowledge
systems (History, literature,
etc.)**

Note: *On the concepts of “international cultural grammar of nationhood” and “international epistemic communities,” see further discussions in Wang (2004a).
**On the concepts of “nation-view” and “History” with a capital H, see Duara (1995).

result in an identity crisis. This is precisely the case of Taiwan ever
since the 1990s. To be sure, the escalation of nationalist politics can be
viewed as a reflection of the growing institutional failure of the ROC
nation, which leads, on the one hand, to an identity crises in Taiwan,
and on other, to a resentment towards China.
Before I set forth my analysis of those institutional failures of the
ROC, a brief historical sketch will help to clarify things. Prior to 1889,
when Taiwan became a province of the Chinese Empire by the Qing
Dynasty, the island of Taiwan, known as Formosa to Westerners, had
been partially occupied by the Dutch, Spanish, Americans, and the
Japanese, some of whom established administrative offices for shortterm rule. In 1895, Taiwan was ceded to Japan by the Qing Dynasty
and was under Japanese colonization for fifty years. As China was
undergoing its modern nation-building process during the Republican
period (from 1911 to 1945), Taiwan was becoming “Japanized” under
Japanese colonialism at the same time.8 After Japan’s defeat in the
Second World War in 1945, Taiwan was once again turned over to the
then Chinese government, namely, the KMT regime. Four years later,
the ruling KMT lost the civil war to the Chinese Communist Party and
took refuge in Taiwan. Whereas the CCP founded the People’s Republic of China and gradually gained international recognition as the representative state of China, the exiled KMT regime, insisting that its
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national title remain the “Republic of China,” continued to effectively
be a state on Taiwan until 2000. While both the PRC and the ROC were
competing to claim sovereignty over Taiwan by drawing on legacies of
Chinese history, a third claim was made by nationalist supporters of
the Taiwan Independence Movement, who insisted that Taiwan should
become an independent nation-state that would be autonomous from
China. The Democratic Progress Party, consisting of TI supporters in
the main, was formed in 1986 and became the major opposition party.
Against this backdrop, the election of DPP-nominated Chen Shuibian as President of the ROC in 2000 marked a watershed in Taiwan’s
history. Not only did it end the 55-year rule of the KMT on the island,
but it also shifted the nation-building momentum of the ROC. However, as institutional analysis emphasizes the path dependence of historical development, there were enormous institutional legacies from the
preceding KMT state that Chen’s new government could hardly do
without. Suffice it to say that most of the signifying institutions of the
ROC—the national title, national anthem, and national flag that the
proponents of the independence movement had long vowed to overthrow—were kept intact after Chen’s inauguration. This reveals the
analytical power of the institutionalist approach that this study shall
demonstrate, as many institutional crises and predicaments that the
KMT created still haunt the succeeding DPP government. The central
argument of this essay holds that the recent identity crisis in Taiwan
has deep historical roots in ROC’s institutions. One cannot comprehend the situation after 2000 if one does not fully understand how the
ROC institutions came into existence in the first place. The main body
of the analysis, therefore, will focus on the situation before 2000, in
which most references to the ROC government refer to the KMT state.
The situation under the DPP rule, after 2000, will be discussed subsequently, and I shall show how ROC institutions have both enabled and
constrained DPP’s pursuit of an independent nationhood.
Due to space limitations and for the sake of clarity, the following
analysis will focus mainly on civic-territorial types of institutions. The
far more complicated situations concerning ethno-cultural institutions
should be dealt with separately.9
IV. Institutional Failures of the ROC Nation and their Effects
The current institutional shell under which Taiwan has been conceived
of as a nation-state is that of the “Republic of China” built by the KMT
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after 1949. Indeed, the KMT invested enormous efforts in building the
ROC nation on Taiwan for various reasons. One of the major reasons
was to legitimate its rule over the island by claiming that Taiwan was
part of China and that the KMT was the only legitimate government of
China. The other reason was to “clean up” the existing colonial legacies
that Japan had left in Taiwan. Ironically, while the KMT was quite successful in turning the Taiwanese people into Chinese by implementing
these institutions, it unwittingly built a quasi-nation that was not originally intended. The pro-independence DPP took full advantage of this
institutional shell to claim that Taiwan was already an independent
nation-state when it came to power. More precisely, institutions of the
ROC nation worked quite well on the domestic/national level (Table 1),
but failed to function on the global/international level. These failures
will be examined in three institutional sites: diplomacy, international
organizations, and signifying institutions like national titles and the
national flag.
A. The Tug of Diplomatic War: “Organized Hypocrisy” and ROC’s
Struggles for Sovereignty
One of the major tasks assumed by nationalism is to build (or maintain) a sovereign state, whereas state sovereignty, as Stephen Krasner has bluntly put it, is nothing more than “organized hypocrisy.”10
According to the logic of organized hypocrisy, sovereignty and territoriality are, to a large extent, dependent upon the approval by others,
regardless of the de facto ruling capacity and jurisdiction of a regime.
This is particularly relevant in the case of Taiwan. After its retreat to
Taiwan, the KMT state still insisted that it was the only legitimate government of China, despite the fact that it had lost over 99% of its territory, including the capital Nanking (now Nanjing). Nonetheless, the
backing of the United States ensured and perpetuated the persistence
of such a fictitious claim of legitimacy. The majority of other states
initially supported the ROC and accordingly refused to recognize the
PRC. Although the 1950s and the 1960s saw a growing number of
countries switching their recognition to PRC, the ROC was still able to
maintain a greater number of diplomatic ties than the PRC (see Table
2). As the Cold War strategy by the West was to keep Communist
China alienated from the world, the KMT state, maintaining the fiction
of being the sole and legitimate government of the whole of China,
still kept its seat as the representative of China in the U.N. The turning
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point came in October 1971, when the General Assembly of the U.N.
adopted Resolution 2758 recognizing the People’s Republic of China as
the sole legitimate representative government of China and moved to
“expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place
which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the
organizations related to it.”11
In fact, Taiwan was given a chance to remain in the U.N. in 1971, but
its then-President, Chiang Kai-shek, refused to give serious consideration to that proposal, adhering to a belief in the nationalist doctrine
that there could not be two Chinas.12 No matter how “contingent” this
decision might have been, it determined the institutional setup that
was to decisively shape the development of Taiwan’s nationalist politics in the later years.
As Anthony Giddens puts it, “[n]ation-states only exist in systemic
relations with other nation-states.”13 Diplomatic relations, therefore,
are one of the crucial manifestations of a state’s sovereignty. Conversely,
the lack of diplomatic relations implies the absence of state sovereignty
and the non-existence of the nation. This is where organized hypocrisy
assumes center stage. To compete for the claim of being the only legitimate state of the Chinese nation, the ROC and the PRC have been waging diplomatic wars—a zero-sum game—by extinguishing each other’s
diplomatic ties. Since the ROC and the PRC did not recognize each
other, they did not allow double recognition either. When a third-party
country established diplomatic ties with one side, the other side would
sever formal relations with that country. Although in recent years the
ROC has tried to loosen up this policy to compensate for its ever-deteriorating diplomatic situation, the PRC is holding more tightly to this
zero-sum standpoint.
Table 2 illustrates the tug-of-war between the “two Chinas.” Before
1971, the ROC was able to outnumber and out-maneuver its archrival in diplomatic ties. However, ever since 1971, this situation has
reversed. The ROC’s number of diplomatic ties dropped drastically
after its expulsion from the U.N., while the 1980s witnessed the worst
years of the ROC’s diplomatic situation: the number of diplomatic ties
dropped to 22, which accounted for merely 13% of the total countries
in the world.
With the efforts of “pragmatic diplomacy” in the late 1980s, the
situation improved somewhat, but only by a slight margin. The situation became worse after DPP’s rule in 2000. As pointed out, the DPP
has conveniently inherited the ROC’s institutional shell to adduce the
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Table 2: Countries with Diplomatic Ties to the ROC and the PRC, Selected Years*

Year
1950
60
66
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
2000
01
02
03
04

Total of
Countries

ROC’s
diplomatic
ties

147
149
150
156
157
158
161
164
166
168
168
169
170
170
171
171
171
171
170
187
189
190
190
191
191
191
191
191
191
191
192
192
192

44
59
66
69
67
56
42
38
32
27
26
23
22
22
22
23
23
24
25
23
23
23
22
26
28
29
29
30
29
30
30
29
27
29
29
28
27
27
26

Percentage

PRC’s
diplomatic
ties

Percentage

29%
26%
21%
17%
17%
15%
14%
13%
13%
14%
14%
14%
15%
14%
13%
13%
13%
15%
16%
16%
15%
16%
15%
16%
16%
15%
14%
15%
15%
15%
14%
14%
14%

23
42
51
50
54
74
85
89
97
106
111
114
116
120
124
124
125
129
130
133
133
133
136
135
135
138
152
159
160
161
161
161
163
162
162
163
165
165
166

58%
60%
65%
68%
71%
72%
72%
73%
75%
74%
74%
76%
76%
78%
78%
78%
80%
79%
79%
74%
80%
84%
84%
84%
84%
84%
85%
85%
85%
85%
86%
86%
86%

Source: Wei 1991: 2; Gao 1994: 58-9; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic
of China; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan).
Note: *The numbers indicate the total of diplomatic ties at the end of each year.
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claim that Taiwan is already an independent country. Actualizing such
a claim, however, requires comprehensive diplomatic recognition. In
response, the PRC has become ever more dogmatic on its “One China”
policy and has taken harsher measures to oust Taiwan from the international arena. This leads us to another battleground, namely, international organizations.
B. Participation in International Organizations
Another institutional site in which state sovereignty is embodied is
that of international organizations.14 Indeed, the proliferation of
international organizations should not be seen as the growing transcendence of the nation-state; on the contrary, it is one in which the
universal scope of the nation-state has been established, and in which
nation-statehood has been constructed.15 Because the United Nations is
the major institution of international society, expulsion from the U.N.
thereby disqualified the ROC’s membership in all U.N.-related organs
and most intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Table 3 shows the
declining memberships of the ROC in IGOs as compared with other
“divided nations,” such as Korea and formerly Germany.16
As we can see, Taiwan’s membership in IGOs dropped drastically
between 1966 and 1997, in sharp contrast to the PRC’s rapid rise since
the ’70s. The late ’80s witnessed Taiwan’s worst years of international
Table 3: IGO Membership Figures for Taiwan (ROC), PRC, and
Other “Divided Nations”

Year
Country
Taiwan (ROC)
PRC
Korea, South
Korea, North
Germany, West
Germany, East
Hong Kong2

1960

1966

1977

1988

1997

2004

22
2
19
2
70
4

39
1
29
3
85
5

10
21
39
12
87
34

6
37
42
22
82
47

11
52
51
18

46
544
500
195

831

1237

0

2

4

11

1

14

84

Source: Union of International Associations (1997/98), Appendix 3 – Table 3; Union of
International Association (2004/05), Appendix 3 – Table 2; Weng (1990: 30), Table 1.
Note: 1East and West Germanys were unified in 1990.
2
Hong Kong was formerly a British colony before 1 July 1997, and is now a Special
Administrative Region of the PRC.
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connection, with its membership in IGOs plunging into single digit
figures. That was not the case for the other “divided nations.” Even
North Korea, which has been known for its longtime international
isolation, is in a better position than Taiwan. At the bottom of the table,
Hong Kong is added as another case in point. A British colony in 1988
and a Special Administrative Region of the PRC in 1997, Hong Kong
enjoyed better international connections than Taiwan, even though it
did not have nation-state status. If we turn to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the story is different and more complicated (see
Table 4). Although the PRC has deliberately obstructed Taiwan’s membership in international organizations, it is simply impossible to bar
Taiwan’s entry into all NGOs, since there are too many of them (well
over 20,000). This is considered advantageous by the ROC government
and a chance to compensate for its losses on the diplomatic battlefield.
Therefore, the state has deliberately (and desperately) promoted participation in all kinds of NGOs in order to symbolically “claim sovereignty.”
In the 1970s, despite the fact that the PRC was able to reverse
international diplomacy in favor of itself, China still remained quite
isolated from international communities (with only 71 NGO memberships), while Taiwan was relatively more active in NGOs than its rival.
Although the PRC’s membership in the NGOs climbed in the 1980s and
eventually exceeded that of the ROC in the 1990s, the ROC remained in
better shape in the NGOs than it did in the IGOs, since its membership
did not fall too far behind the PRC and that of other divided nations.
Table 4: NGO Membership Figures for Taiwan (ROC), PRC, and
Other “Divided Nations

Year
Country

1960

1966

1977

1988

1997

2004

Taiwan (ROC)
PRC
Korea, South
Korea, North
Germany, West
Germany, East

108
30
102
22
841
102

182
58
209
48
1115
183

239
71
371
63
1399
393

574
517
779
138
2406
793

908
1136
1200
185

2547
3466
3229
391

32911

10210

93

164

312

690

1070

2800

Hong Kong2

1

Source: Same as Table 3.
Note: Same as Table 3.
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Two factors account for the exacerbation of the institutional crises
experienced by the ROC nation in the recent decades. The first concerns the rising role of the PRC. As shown in Table 4, PRC’s memberships in NGOs doubled from 1988 to 1997, and then tripled from 1997
to 2004. This clearly indicates that China has become a much more
active participant in international communities and is much more
open to outsiders. The impacts on Taiwan are twofold: On the one
hand, PRC’s participation in either IGOs or NGOs often demanded the
exclusion of Taiwan, or the downgrading of Taiwan’s membership. As
a consequence, the condition for Taiwan’s participation in international
communities, either in state or non-state terms, is becoming increasingly difficult. On the other hand, the PRC’s rising role in international
society has significantly changed outsiders’ perceptions of “China”
and “the Chinese.” These impacts, profound and widespread in not
only political but also cultural, social, and economic realms, shall be
discussed in a later section.
The second factor for the ROC’s worsening institutional crises lies in
the discrepancy between the state and society in terms of their interaction with international communities. Combining Tables 3 and 4, we
find that, on the one hand, the state experiences increasing constraints
as its membership in IGOs significantly lags behind most other states,
whereas, on the other hand, Taiwan’s civil society has significantly
increased its interaction with international communities. As the interaction between Taiwan and the global community accelerates, there
emerges coterminously a rising awareness of the awkward situation
of Taiwan in the international setting. There also emerges a rising
collective anxiety within Taiwanese society concerning the country’s
membership/status in those international organizations, such as the
United Nations, GATT/WTO, and the Olympics, among numerous
others. Here we encounter a critical issue of Taiwan’s national identity;
namely, the signifying institutions, which include the naming system
and representational symbols of the collectivity.
C. “What’s in a Name?”: The ROC and Its Misnomers
In his theoretical elaboration on language and symbolic power, French
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu has made a point so illuminating to the
case of Taiwan that it is worth quoting in extenso:
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The social sciences deal with pre-named, pre-classified realities which
bear proper nouns and common nouns, titles, signs and acronyms. At
the risk of unwittingly assuming responsibility for the acts of constitution of whose logic and necessity they are unaware, the social sciences
must take as their object of study the social operations of naming and
the rites of institution through which they are accomplished. But on a
deeper level, they must examine the part played by words in the construction of social reality and the contribution which the struggle over
classifications, a dimension of all class struggles, makes to the constitution of classed—classes defined in terms of age, set, or social position,
but also clans, tribes, ethnic groups or nations.17

Few, if any, countries suffer from naming as much as Taiwan does.
The politics of naming, characterized by Bourdieu as “rites of institution,” has been playing a central part in nationalist politics, as the
withdrawal of recognition of the ROC government has had a direct
and profound impact on the naming system of Taiwan. Under pressure
from the PRC, the national title “Republic of China,” which implies
“two Chinas,” is no longer acceptable in most formal international
settings. Unlike the case of other divided nations such as Korea and
former Germany, U.N. Resolution 2758 has made it an institutional
script that there is only “one China.” This institutional script is very
important in understanding Taiwan’s national predicament. People
know that there are “two Koreas” and that there used to be “two
Germanys.” However, to speak of “two Chinas” nowadays appears
as nonsensical as “two Americas.” On the other hand, the simple and
straightforward term “Taiwan” was simultaneously unacceptable to
the PRC nor desirable to the ROC under the rule of the KMT before
2000. The use of “Taiwan” in the official title implies that Taiwan is an
independent nation-state, which neither the PRC nor the KMT state
of the ROC before 2000 (both of whom insisted that Taiwan is part of
China) would be pleased to see. As a result, “how to name the political community formed on this island” has become a thorny problem.
Even abroad there are so many struggles to find a proper title for this
community. They are best reflected in the variety of alternative official
names used in the ROC’s overseas representative institutions (including both official and “quasi” or “semi-official” liaison offices, shown in
Table 5).
It is apparent from Table 5 that, for 1972, only 33% of overseas representative institutions used the formal national title of the ROC, while
the majority used simply Taiwan. However, the situation significantly
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Table 5. Official Titles Used in Taiwan’s Overseas Representative Institutions*

Year
Titles

1972

1982

1992

2005

Republic of China
Taiwan
Chinese
Taipei
Far East/Oriente1
ROC (Taiwan)2
Others3

33%
44%
11%

11%
11%
11%
3%
49%

17%
4%
2%
67%
4%
6%

22%
2%

11%

14%

68%
5%
2%

Source: Compiled from Gao 1994: 124; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
China (Taiwan).
Note: *Including embassies, consulates, and other “quasi-official” liaison offices in
countries with no diplomatic ties with Taiwan.
1
E.g., Far East Trade Service Inc. Lebanon Office; Centro Comercial Del Lejano Oriente,
Lima, Republic del Peru.
2
This formula uses the national title “ROC” followed by “Taiwan” in the parentheses in
order not to be mistaken for China, the PRC.

changed in the ’80s. In 1982, 49% of overseas foreign institutions that
represented the ROC used the rather ambiguous and misleading term
Far East (Oriente) as their official designated title. Fourteen percent of
these institutions, mostly in European countries such as Spain, Belgium, Switzerland, and Holland, used even more confusing terms such
as “Sun Yat-sen Center,” as their official designated title. The combination of these two categories (63% in total) accounted for more than
half of Taiwan’s representative institutions in foreign countries whose
official designated titles carried neither the ROC’s national title, nor
the geographical name of Taiwan, nor an ethno-cultural description of
the ROC’s Chinese identity. Beginning with the government’s efforts
at “pragmatic diplomacy” in the late ’80s, the situation has undergone
significant alteration again. But there is only marginal improvement
in this new naming strategy due in no small measure to the PRC’s
increasing pressure on other countries. The use of the national title
ROC increased marginally from 11% to 17%, but the more commonly
known “Taiwan” dropped from 11% to a mere 4%. On the other hand,
the misleading names such as “Far East” drastically dropped to 4%,
while the most commonly used title (at 67%) is “Taipei,” the putative
capital city of Taiwan.18 This formula appears to be acceptable to both
the PRC and the ROC. From the PRC’s point of view, “Taipei” defines
only a local government, just as “Hong Kong” once did. Conversely
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on the ROC’s side, “Taipei” is interpreted as a political authority parallel to that of “Beijing” or “Washington,” as is often used in Western
media.
The problem of naming has also afflicted Taiwan’s membership in
international organizations. Among many others, four formulae stand
out as the most noteworthy. On the IGO side, Taiwan appears as “Taipei, China” in the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and as “Taiwan,
China” in the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol).19
On the NGO side, Taiwan appears as “Chinese Taipei” in the International Olympic Committee and as “Academy of Science located in Taipei, China” in the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU).20
In addition, an even more unusual title of “Separate Customs Territory
of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu” was used when the ROC government applied for membership in the GATT/WTO.
While the variety of these names appears confusing to outsiders, it
is also admitted that, “if the name of our overseas representing institutions is too wide of the mark, it will not only derogate our nationhood,
but also strike the self-esteems of our nationals.”21 One can imagine
how confusing it is to a foreigner who needs to go to a “Far East
Trade Service Inc.” or a “Sun Yat-sen Center” in order to apply for a
travel visa or other official document of Taiwan. For those who are
from Taiwan, it is frustrating and sometimes humiliating to see that
the name of their homeland appears under various guises. Even an
ROC minister at the Sun Yat-sen Cultural Center in Belgium could not
refrain from complaining: “Cultural Center? Who the hell knows what
it is!”22 For those nationalist supporters of Taiwan Independence, it has
become common practice to ridicule the ROC’s ever-changing names
of its overseas institutions by characterizing the ROC as the “Republic
of Cheating”23 or as the “Republic of Confusion.”24
Moreover, in addition to the national title, all signifying institutions
pertaining to the ROC—from its national flag and national anthem to
its passport and official documents—are not supposed to be accepted
in international arenas. The importance of these institutions is, again,
underscored in Bourdieu’s insightful argument:
The act of institution is thus an act of communication, but of a particular
kind: it signifies to someone what his identity is, but in a way that both
expresses it to him and imposes it on him by expressing it in front of
everyone and thus informing him in an authoritative manner of what he
is and what he must be.25
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In other words, identity is about both self-recognition and recognition by others.26 Thus, the failure of the ROC’s institutions has led
to an identity crisis of its nationals in that, in front of others, there is
no institutional way for them to signify who they are in a definite,
“authoritative” manner. To be sure, the signifying institutions of the
ROC have only domestic, without international, credibility. This awkward situation in part accounts for the identity crisis in Taiwan. For
instance, at the 1996 Olympic Games held in Atlanta, a Taiwanese
overseas student was arrested by the U.S. police for waving the unrecognized national flag of the ROC. The arrest, made at the request of a
PRC official, was based on the regulations of the International Olympic
Committee (IOC). According to the IOC’s regulations, it is prescribed
that the national flag of Taiwan (whose membership appears as “Chinese Taipei” rather than the “ROC”) should not appear throughout the
Olympic Games, nor at any official occasion.27 This incident involving
an individual was considered an insult to the entire Taiwanese society,
since it once again reminded the public of the humiliating fact that
the collective representations of their community (national title, flag,
anthem) were not allowed to appear in the Olympic Games or most
other international occasions. There was significant news coverage of
this incident in the mass media, people anxiously discussed “national
dignity” in the public sphere, and TI nationalists took this opportunity
to ridicule the unrecognized ROC nation and advocated turning it into
the “Republic of Taiwan.”28
The true irony of it all was in 2000 when the pro-TI DPP became
the ruling party. Instead of a name change into “Republic of Taiwan,”
the national title remained the “Republic of China.” It is apparent
the insufficiency of the ethnic explanation of Taiwan’s national question and the strength of institutional analysis. As Chen Shui-bian was
elected the President of the ROC through a democratic election, his
legitimacy stemmed from the institutions of the ROC. If he overthrows
ROC’s institutions, he runs the risk of losing his legitimacy of rule.
More importantly, if Chen ruthlessly changes the national title to the
“Republic of Taiwan,” it would have been viewed as a serious and provocative act of “declaring independence.” Neither the PRC nor the U.S.
would allow this to happen. This involves the triad dynamics between
U.S.-Taiwan-China, which lies beyond the scope of this essay; however,
the organized hypocrisy it entails has had a profound impact that is
worth further consideration.
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V. The Trickle-Down Effects of Organized Hypocrisy:
Identity Crises and Resentment
The failures and crises of the ROC nation have caused increasing difficulties to the Taiwanese people during the globalization process in the
past decade or so. Globalization increases the scope for people to interact with the outside world through cross-border and trans-boundary
activities, but the Taiwanese people are doing so only to find that their
own country’s institutions do not really work. This can be understood
in light of what can be called “the trickle-down effects of organized
hypocrisy,” which is illustrated in Figure 1.
In the previous section, I have drawn on Stephen Krasner’s argument that the aim of civic-territorial institutions is to pursue state sovereignty, which is nothing more than organized hypocrisy. Figure 1
illustrates an ideal situation in which two states (state A and state
B) grant each other sovereignty through organized hypocrisy on the
level of high politics. Through the mediation of institutional effects,

Figure 1: The “Trickle-Down Eﬀects” of Organized Hypocrisy
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the impact of organized hypocrisy may “trickle down” to the level of
low or non-politics, which consists of fields and spheres that have been
characterized as “private sectors,” “civil society,” or “life worlds” in
different theoretical perspectives. If we use the term “politics” in its
narrowest sense by confining it to practices and activities directly pertaining to the state (as in “high politics”), then most affairs on this level
are ordinarily considered as being of a low- or non-political nature.
It is on this lower level that the non-state sectors of “world society”
or “global (civil) society” are conceived, while “world culture” takes
shape. On the other hand, there are feedbacks moving from the lower
to the higher levels, which provide the existing state with legitimacy,
support, pressures, rebellions, and more.
Figure 1 shows only a simplified model between two states, but this
would hold good and can be generalized to a multi-state system as
well. Since the institutional effects of the state have been resilient and
durable, and since recent globalization entails increasing interactions
and interconnectedness not only on the high-politics, but also on the
low- or non-politics level, Figure 1 suggests that organized hypocrisy is seen not only in state sovereignty, but also in daily life that is
ostensibly of a nonpolitical or apolitical nature. Indeed, globalization
may have undermined the foundations of the nation-state and/or state
sovereignty in a variety of ways, but it may also have strengthened
organized hypocrisy by reinforcing the institutional prerogatives of
the existing nation-state. This explains why Taiwan’s nationalist politics escalates rather than declines during the course of democratization
and globalization. I shall analyze two aspects of this: identity crisis and
resentment.
A. Struggles over Nomenclature and the Politics of Identity
The notion of identity implies something to be identified with. This
“something,” however, requires a name or a “signifier” to exist in the
first place. The construction of social reality postulates the institution of
nomenclature, which, in turn, is constitutive of individuals.29 Without
a name, the identity of actors cannot possibly be evoked. In this light,
at the core of Taiwan’s identity crisis we find the problem of naming:
there is no way of naming these people and their collectivity. Insofar as
“nationality” and “citizenship” are concerned, the terms “China” and
“Chinese” have been preempted by the PRC. When the two terms are
used, they are meant to refer to the PRC, not the ROC. This is further
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complicated by the problematic terms “Taiwan” and “Taiwanese” as
used to refer to nation and nationality. Many outsiders have been perplexed by the following question: If the name “Republic of China” has
brought Taiwan infinite problems, why can’t it just be replaced it with
a new one such as the “Republic of Taiwan,” or simply “Taiwan”? That
would solve its problems all at once. But indeed, there are profound
complexities that attend the adoption of these solutions.
By the 1990s, the KMT state of Taiwan had maintained that Taiwan
was not a country, but the ROC was. Although this rhetoric has gradually eroded since Lee Teng-hui assumed power, such a doctrine has left
strong institutional legacies that even the successor Chen Shui-bian,
who used to maintain that all symbolic institutions of the ROC should
be overthrown, cannot do without. Furthermore, the state of the PRC,
for deep nationalistic reasons, does not allow “Taiwan” for a country
name either. Since the PRC also claims its sovereignty over Taiwan
by seeing it as part of Chinese territory, to turn Taiwan into a country
name would in effect disqualify its claim over the island. The PRC’s
position is backed by its military forces, as it repetitively threatens
to attack Taiwan should the latter declare independence. As a consequence, there is no way to name the political community of Taiwan
insofar as nation and nationality are concerned. Neither “Taiwan/Taiwanese” nor “China/Chinese” can serve the function of signifying the
political community on this island. The identity crisis is to a large
extent related to the problem of naming, but it cannot be easily solved
by simply changing the name, since the change of name itself is under
severe constraints resulting from organized hypocrisy. Commenting
on such a predicament, a journalist lamented:
It is becoming increasingly difficult for our officials to refer to our own
country. Our national title is surely “ROC,” but to speak of the “Republic
of China” to foreigners, nine out of ten times it will be mistaken for the
PRC across the strait. To speak of the “ROC on Taiwan,” it sounds awkward and the listeners can make neither head nor tail of what it means.
But to speak of “Taiwan,” we will be accused [by the PRC] of advocating
Taiwan Independence. Thus, under the close examinations of the PRC,
the unificationists, and the TI supporters, to refer to our country without making mistakes…is like walking on a high wire; a slight slip of the
tongue will cause troubles… . Taiwan’s current predicament lies exactly
in not knowing how to be ourselves.30

65

Macalester International

Vol. 18

Thus, we can argue that the primary problem is not so much about
identity itself as about the problem of naming and the signifying institutions. Institutions signify the existence of a collectivity such as a
nation; conversely, the malfunction or dysfunction of these signifying institutions jeopardizes the existence of such a collectivity. Only
through this perspective can we understand why, whenever it comes
to the thorny problem of the national question, there has been a rising
anxiety that “Taiwan will gradually disappear from the world map,”
since there is no institutional way through which it can signify its existence. The non-existence of the society in the institutional settings is
accompanied by the sentiment of being an “international orphan” in
the global village. In such circumstances, a deep resentment eventually
arises.
B. Resentment and “Chain Reaction”
The longtime isolation of Taiwan (as a collectivity) from international
society has brought about profound psychological effects to the collective mentality in Taiwanese society that can be characterized as
“resentment.” I use this term to follow a Nietzschean-Schelerian tradition of analysis. As is widely known, Friedrich Nietzsche first introduced the concept of resentment to the world of modern thought, but
it was another seminal German thinker, Max Scheler, who equipped
the concept with full analytical power in his highly acclaimed but
much neglected monograph Ressentiment.31 In his analysis, resentment,
a characteristic of the rising bourgeoisie, is the most powerful and
influential psychological locomotive in modern society. There are two
sociological conditions that jointly lead to the rise of resentment: one is
“theoretical comparability” and the other is “the discrepancy between
theoretical (expected) and factual (actualized) status.” The impact of
resentment, profound and long lasting, eventually leads to what Scheler called “value-shifts” or “transvaluations” in the modern world. In
this sense, nationalism can be seen as a manifestation of transvaluations resulting from resentment, as Liah Greenfeld32 has convincingly
demonstrated in her comparative study of nationalism in five countries.
As I have pointed out elsewhere, current nationalist politics in Taiwan have been characterized by undisguised ressentiment—ressentiment towards each other and towards the outside world.33 The two
sociological preconditions of ressentiment are particularly relevant to
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Taiwan. Taiwan’s de facto statehood makes a majority of people think
that Taiwan is theoretically comparable to other sovereign nation-states
in terms of rights and status. However, there exists a huge discrepancy
when it comes to actualizing such a right and status, since its counterparts rarely recognize it as a state, in addition to the fact that it has
been constantly excluded from international society. What is worse,
although Taiwan is not officially recognized as a state, many outsiders
simply “misrecognize” Taiwan as a state. Such a confusing and inconsistent situation, which is herein characterized as a “neither-nor” status
(neither a state nor a non-state), makes the contrast between “theoretical comparability” and the discrepancies (between the theoretical and
the actual) even more acute and absurd. The issues thus involved are
of various kinds, ranging from the most macro collective level, such as
membership in the United Nations or WHO (World Health Organization), to the most micro individual level, such as passports and visas.34
The two sociological preconditions of ressentiment have existed for
decades, but they had not received due attention from the wider public
until the late 1980s and early 1990s, when democratization and ethnic
mobilization undermined the KMT’s rule as well as the legitimacy of
the ROC. Furthermore, as Taiwanese society became more open to
the outside world during the new tide of globalization, the discrepancies between “theoretical comparability” and the actual situation have
become much more widely perceived. In such circumstances, ressentiment emerges as a result, and it is further fueled by increasing repression from the PRC. In other words, it is a response to the intensifying
new Chinese nationalism that characterizes the PRC in recent years.
The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) crisis in 2003 provides us with vivid illustrations of the ressentiment in Taiwan. When
the first case of SARS was reported, the entire Taiwanese society was
overwhelmed by this previously unknown disease that was believed to
be of external origin. Its spread was transnational and its containment
called for international cooperation, but Taiwan was intentionally left
out of these efforts and received little help from the outside world
for apparent political reasons. Worse yet, the PRC officials grandly
announced to the world that Taiwan had been well taken care of by the
Chinese government’s health system, notwithstanding the fact that Taiwan was not under PRC’s jurisdiction. Such a fictitious claim infuriated
almost the entire Taiwanese society. Moreover, when Taiwan attempted
to apply for observer membership in the World Health Assembly in
May, the appeal was denied for the seventh consecutive time. The Chi-
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Figure 2: “Chain Reaction of Nationalist Politics in China and Taiwan”

nese officials even made several harsh and caustic comments towards
Taiwan both during and outside of the meeting. The reaction from
Taiwan’s side burnt into an uproar of dismay. Some people used emotional words such as “beast country” or “evil bandits” to characterize
China. A high official in Taiwan commented, “Communists were too
detestable. We are pissed off.”35 Not only state officials were chagrined.
A sense of injustice was widespread in public opinion. Advocates of
Taiwan Independence seized this moment to reiterate their conviction
that China was an uncivilized hegemonic power that Taiwan should
remain independent from, and that Taiwan should make all the more
effort to pursue a recognized statehood in international society.
The rising tide of nationalism in China in the past decade makes
the PRC take an even harsher stance on the Taiwan issue. Not only
does it issue numerous warnings against Taiwanese nationalism, but
it has also been making more effort to oust Taiwan from international
society. The effects of such acts, however, have had a contrary effect.
The harsher Chinese nationalism becomes, the more it pushes Taiwan
away. As Ernest Renan puts it, suffering is more powerful than joy to
mobilize nationalist sentiments: “Where national memories are concerned, griefs are of more value than triumphs, for they impose duties,
and require a common effort.”36 This is particularly true of the Taiwanese case. By making the Taiwanese people “suffer together,” China’s
new nationalism has strengthened rather than weakened its Taiwanese
counterpart.
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The two nationalisms on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are therefore interlocked and mutually reinforcing. Their respective strengths
intensify each other. The more nationalistic the one side becomes, the
stronger its counterpart grows. The fundamentalists on both sides are
mobilizing their followers for tragic sacrifice at all costs. This situation
can be portrayed as “chain reactions,” as illustrated in Figure 2.37 As
can be imagined, the possible result of their impact can be profound
and devastating. War, for instance, is a possibility that worries many.
VI. Other Factors and Prospects: How to Untie the Gordian Knot?
As pointed out in the beginning, the divided-nation model tells only a
half-truth of cross-Strait relations, while the other half of non-truth illuminates the very core of Taiwan’s national question. All other divided
nations after WW II sought reunification—Vietnam and Germany did
it, while the two Koreas (North and South) are still on their way, slowly
inching forward. The case of China and Taiwan is perhaps the only
exception. Why?
I’m not suggesting that the lack of international recognition is the
only cause of Taiwan’s national question, nor am I hinting that, once
Taiwan’s international status is solved, its national question will disappear. The legacy of Japanese colonialism and the tragic February 28
Incident, in which the distinctions, along with the hostilities, between
two major “ethnic groups” began to emerge, should not be left out of
the picture. These factors certainly confound the problem. However,
we can make a bold argument that, had there been an institutional
script for “two Chinas” in international society, then Taiwan’s national
question would have taken a different shape and become much easier
to solve. There might still be an independence movement, but its scope
would not be as wide as we see today. Much of the appeal of Taiwanese
nationalism has been constructed as a negative narrative, first against
the Mainlanders and the KMT, and now against the PRC. The resentment against China has become deep-seated and widespread. There
is a popular joke about elections, saying that the Chinese Communist
Party is “the best campaigner” for the DPP (or TI), because the harsher
China treats Taiwan, the farther it pushes Taiwanese people away from
identification with China. The “One China policy” has strengthened
the resentment of the Taiwanese people. By paralyzing the institutions
of the ROC, it has brought great hardship to the Taiwanese people and
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has thus forced them to lend sympathy or support to the ever-growing
Taiwanese nationalism.
In addition, many Chinese people are actively and aggressively
participating in “organized hypocrisy” by ousting Taiwan from international society, or by downgrading Taiwan’s membership in non-governmental organizations. This forces Taiwanese participants to change
their name into “Taiwan, China” or other forms that symbolically signify that “Taiwan is part of China.”38 These acts are not helpful in
improving cross-Strait relations. In effect, by antagonizing the Taiwanese people and reinforcing their resentment, they are harmful acts.
As a matter of fact, the state and people on both sides of the Taiwan
Strait feel that they are bullied, mistreated, or discriminated against
in international society. The resultant negative feelings of resentment
further fuel nationalistic sentiments on both sides. The escalation of
nationalism in both Taiwan and China is certainly not a good thing. It
may fall into a vicious cycle (“chain reaction”) in which the strengthening of the one will certainly lead to the strengthening of the other.
Cross-Strait interactions during the past few years are another
newly emerging and highly complicated issue that deserves a separate study. Although the political situation has been in a stalemate for
decades, there has emerged a rapidly growing and expanding interaction between non-governmental sectors on both sides. The most significant is in the economic sector, as numerous Taiwanese business
and enterprises swarm to invest in the PRC. What their impact on
Taiwan’s national question will be remains unknown, as there are too
many variables that cannot be definitely determined. Some may hold
an optimistic hope that the increasing interaction between Taiwan and
China will help people on both sides understand each other and, thus,
during the process, the “Taiwan problem” can be solved in a peaceful
way. This can happen, but only on the presupposition that people on
both sides can momentarily put aside their nationalistic view towards
each other, and a better mutual understanding can be achieved during
the process. From my observations during field studies of Taiwanese
migrants in Shanghai, however, this does not seem to be the case.39
In terms of its international status, Taiwan can be said to be a political oddity in contemporary world politics. Although the PRC has reiterated time and again that the so-called “Taiwan problem” is a “domestic
affair of China” and that it will not tolerate intervention by outsiders,
such claims, stated in overt nationalistic tones, are themselves symptomatic of the international nature of Taiwan’s national question. As
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we have seen, Taiwan’s relations with China have been internationally
framed from its very beginning and have been reframed by international/geopolitical factors repeatedly—first by the imperial invasion
and colonialism, then the Second World War, then the Cold War, and
now the Realpolitik between strong powers such as the PRC, the U.S.,
and Japan, among others. It is now an open secret that the U.S. has
used Taiwan as a card to play the game against China, and that it is in
the U.S.’s best interests to play the “two-hand strategy” with Taiwan
by keeping it a political oddity; in other words, by maintaining its
ambiguous international status as neither a state nor a non-state—a
quasi-state, indeed. While the U.S. does not allow Taiwan to become
fully independent, it protects it from military acts by the PRC by arming the island. It is thus not surprising that the PRC often accuses those
advocates of Taiwan Independence as being “lackeys of American
Imperialism” because, by cooperating with the U.S., they are in effect
getting in the way of PRC’s interests in favor of those of the U.S. However, such an accusation is unjustifiable to the extent that the PRC does
not really understand what the Taiwanese people have been suffering
from because the main pillars of their social institutions do not hold.
If Taiwan’s national question is indeed internationally framed by
outside factors, it follows that there is room for outsiders to help the
people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to untie the Gordian knot.
Here, Figure 1 is illuminating. State sovereignty is organized hypocrisy that can trickle down to ordinary people and daily life, but it
does not mean that ordinary people must only be passive recipients of
such hypocrisy. Indeed, there is room for ordinary people to maneuver against the state’s hypocrisy, or even the hypocrisy itself can be
changed. Some commentators have argued that six major actors are at
play in the U.S.-Taiwan-China triad: the U.S. government, U.S. people,
the Taiwanese government, the Taiwanese people, the Chinese government, and the Chinese people. The high politics on the intergovernmental level is perhaps out of reach for ordinary people, but if people
on all the sides can better understand the current situation, then there
is a better chance to untie the knot by resorting to a solution that flows
from the bottom rather than from the top. In addition to pressuring
their own governments, people of other nations can help civil society
on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to reduce their feelings of resentment—resentment not only towards each other, but also against the
outside world—by not endorsing organized hypocrisy in non-political
issues as well as in daily life. Such an appeal might sound feeble or
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even naïve to many, but it seems to be the most feasible and reasonable
action that almost everybody can take, not only to reduce the tensions
across the Strait, but to alleviate peoples’ resentments embodied in
various deleterious ideological forms, such as racism, terrorism, fundamentalism—and of course, nationalism. 
•
Notes
1. This paper is in part a result of the research project NSC93-2412-H-001-026 sponsored
by the National Science Council, Taiwan. All Chinese names and characters are romanized in pinyin, unless there is a common usage that has gained wide popularity (e.g., Taipei, Chiang Kai-shek). To follow the convention in Taiwan, however, a dash is inserted
between the second and third characters of the given name where applicable, although it
is acknowledged that this practice does not conform to the pinyin rule developed by the
People’s Republic of China.
2. It should be also noted that the classification of these “ethnic groups” is in itself problematic and has been in dispute in Taiwan’s nationalist politics. I use these two categories only for the purpose of illustration and convenience without indeed subscribing to
them.
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12. Weng 1990: 61; Chen Lung-chu 1996: 191.
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then the notion of “divided nation” becomes problematic. This example shows once
again how elusive the notion “nation” has become in our daily usage.
17. Bourdieu 1991, p. 105, italics in original.
18. However, one should not make the mistake of considering Taipei the capital of the
ROC, since, according to the Constitution, the ROC’s capital is Nanking (now Nanjing),
located in mainland China. This is another example of institutional legacies that the new
DPP government can hardly do without.
19. In both the cases of Interpol and ADB, the ROC as a member initially represented
China until China itself became a member of these organizations in 1984 and 1986,
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respectively. This brought into effect name changes. Thus, the ROC was renamed “Taiwan, China” in Interpol and “Taipei, China” in ADB. The ROC immediately protested
against these name changes since both titles carried the political implication that Taipei/Taiwan was an inherent part of China (the PRC). But in order to avoid possible
expulsion, the ROC compromised and accepted the ADB formula (Taipei, China) “under
protest.” However, it has not accepted the “Taiwan, China” formula so far, nor has it
withdrawn its membership from Interpol (Weng 1990).
20. Ibid.
21. Gao 1994, p. 123.
22. United Daily News, 19 August 1994.
23. Zhuang 1995, p. 27.
24. For instance, see Lin Zhuo-shui 1992, pp. 71–74. Lin writes a short satire in which
a European businessman, having no clue where to apply for travel documents for the
“Republic of China” after mistakenly visiting the PRC’s consulate, is further confused by
Taiwan’s various titles for overseas representative institutions (such as “Far East Trade
Center”).
25. Bourdieu 1990, p. 121.
26. Calhoun 1994, p. 20; Berger and Luckman 1967, p. 132.
27. Central Daily News, 3 August 1996, p. 2.
28. Liberty Times, 4 August 1996.
29. Berger and Luckmann 1967, p.132.
30. Zhang Hui-ying 1997.
31. In their writings, both Nietzsche and Scheler (Max Scheler 1998) intentionally use the
French word ressentiment because they think there is no counterpart in German that can
signify the same meaning. The English translation of Scheler’s work retains the word in
its French form. To make for a smooth read, however, I shall use “resentment” and “ressentiment” interchangeably.
32. Liah Greenfeld 1993.
33. See “Ressentiment in Modern Communities: Some Preliminary Reflections on Taiwan’s Experience” (Wang 2004c). The discussion in this and the next few paragraphs has
been carried out at further length in that essay.
34. I have discussed these issues at further length in other places. See Wang (2004a,
2004b).
35. China Times, 3 June 2003.
36. Renan 1996, p. 53.
37. As indicated in Figure 2, Chinese nationalism also has international causes that are
not dealt with in this essay. For further discussions, see Wang (2004c).
38. Instances of this kind have been numerous, ranging from academic conferences to the
cyberspace of the Internet. Many popular websites are pressured not to list Taiwan as a
“country,” while some list Taiwan as a “province of China.”
39. Wang forthcoming.
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